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
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**THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE SOUTHWEST INDIANS
FROM 1793 TO 1795**

by

MARY HAZELTINE ELA

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
MASTER OF LETTERS**

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CHAPTER I.

Conditions and Political Leadership Among the Four
Tribes.

Even before the economic need of new lands incited the desire of possession, travellers through the southwestern country were impressed with the possibilities of the fertile river valleys, good water power, and heavily timbered lands of the country now comprised within the southern tier of states; one wrote in 1790, that it was only rendered unpleasant by being in the possession of jealous natives^x.

The children of nature enjoyed a lavish birthright certainly, for a population estimated at less than fifty thousand² were holding more than eight-five million acres - a monopoly not tolerable by the civilized codes of the time

Four tribes shared the undisputed claims to the lands and a part of Tennessee. Furthest west, in northern Mississippi, were the Chickasaws, with their villages grouped near the source of the Yazoo, at about the centre of their territories. These lay wholly within the northern third of the state, and broadening toward the East, extended slightly beyond the present Mississippi boundary. The Choctaws, their neighbors on the South, held the rest of the state,

* Schoolcraft; History of Ind. Tribes of U.S., vol. V, p.258.

² Ind. Affairs, vol. I, pp.78, 79.

and all eastward to the Tombigbee river, which was the generally accepted boundary between them and the Creeks. The Cherokees' hunting grounds adjoined those of the Chickasaws, and extending across northern Alabama and Georgia somewhat into South Carolina, included southeastern Tennessee and the southwestern part of North Carolina.

By far the largest portion belonged to the Muscogees: by the treaty of 1790, they acknowledged the Oconee as their eastern boundary, and between this and the Tombigbee on the west, they held full sway from the Gulf to the Cherokee territories on the north.

They had taken their English name, Creeks, from the land of many streams, and tradition had it that their character, too, was an endowment of the excellent climate and pure air and water of their well-chosen country. Whatever the reason, they became famous among Indians for their warlike powers, and developed leaders of diplomacy whose influence was sought by three nations. Altho' theories as to their origin differ somewhat, it seems well established that they had won their homes by conquest, and that by the amalgamation of the conquered tribes and others voluntarily seeking their protection, they had gradually increased their numbers and extended their limits; and by the period of the Revolution they had reached the *height* of their power as

an Indian confederacy.*

Weakest and most differentiated of all the tribes of this confederacy, were the Seminoles, by some authorities said to be the original stock.⁺ Inhabiting chiefly the sandy region of Florida, they lived on the sea-coast by fishing, or raised small patches of corn, shifting about from place to place, and having few permanent towns. Though nominally under a common government with their kinsmen to the north, they had no honored place among them, but were, to a large degree, swayed by the Bully, a Spanish half-breed who lived on the Appalachicola, and Jack Kinnard, a rich Scotch half-breed whose home was at the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee.**

A large part of the Creek territory was given up to hunting grounds - a game preserve to which they resorted during the winter months, leaving their towns utterly deserted. The settled section was toward the center, in the region of the Alabama and Appalachicola and their branches.

The number of their towns is variously estimated by early visitors to the country;° they varied in magnitude

* Schoolcraft; vol.V, p.259.

Milfort; 229 ff.

Pickett; Hist. of Alabama, vol.I, pp.78-89.

Adair; Coll.of Georgia Hist. Soc.,vol.iii,Part I,pp.13-18.

+ Schoolcraft,vol.v,p.260.

** Ibid.

° Schoolcraft:vol.V,p.262. Also Hist.Coll.of Ga.,vol.III, Part I,p.25.

and importance, several villages often being within the government of one town. Benjamin Hawkins who made a report of their country in 1797, 1798, names thirty-seven old, or mother towns. These were in two districts. The twenty-five towns of the Upper Creeks, so called, were scattered along the Coosa and Tallapoosa, from a little below their confluence to form the Alabama to near the head waters; within their jurisdiction were nineteen villages which had not attained the dignity of a share in governing the ceremony of the Boosketah, or annual festival.* To the southwest, a distance of about two days' journey by the *lower* path,† were the Lower Creeks, chiefly upon the main stream of the Chattahoochee, controlling twelve towns and six additional villages.

The houses of each town were scattered along the river banks for a mile or two, grouped in clusters, by clans.**Central and prominent in its location, was the ceremonial gathering place, the public square, a rendezvous both for business and amusement. In a war town, the square was especially decorated. The posts painted red, with black and white edges, indicated that the town led

*Hist.Coll.of Ga.,vol.III,Part I,
†Schoolcraft:vol.V,p.254. *Map of 1794.*
**Ibid.,p.262.
°Ibid.,p.264.
Bqrtram's Travels, pp.453-456.

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in councils of war, and was ruled by a warrior chief.* Towns never stained by blood, were cities of refuge+- a safe asylum for the criminal or escaped captive as long as he remained within their limits. They were peace, white, or beloved towns.**

To the Indian, war was the pathway to distinction; other honors followed upon success in this line. It was the one field of opportunity for the display of manly virtues; he who showed no desire for war was no less than a loafer in the estimation of the community, and was consigned to labor with the squaws. No thought was necessary to determine the boy's career: there was but one ideal - a mighty warrior, strong both to slay and to endure. He should be feared by the enemies of the tribe; his deeds should be sung throughout the clans, and should furnish consolation to him as he recounted them, if doomed to torture by a hostile people.++

For the girls in childhood, the skin of a fawn was a fitting couch, but for the boy, the skin of a lion, that ferocity and strength might be imparted. As a rod of chastisement, the jaw-bone of a gar-fish was chosen, that, early accustomed to the knowledge that the loss of

*Schoolcraft:vol.V,pp.266,279.

+Adair: pp.158,159.

**Ibid. Ind.Affairs, vol.I,p.79.

++Hist.Coll.of Ga.,vol.III,Part I,p.70.

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blood was not dangerous, wounds might be lightly esteemed.* The bringing in of the first scalp or sharing the honor with a party was an occasion for triumphal ceremonies as significant to the Indian's future, as those of the Romans were to the emperor.+ Even within the nation, blood must be avenged by the shedding of blood; retaliation was a part of the Indian's code of honor.**

Such ideals as these are not desirable in neighbors. The instilled ambition for success in war, and the principle of retaliation, took precedence of laws of obedience, and the restraining influence of their elders, counted for little with youths eager to win the prestige of a war^{††} name and a seat of honor at the ceremony of the black drink.°

The process of winning by kindness, races with such moral standards, proved to be a weighty burden for civilized nations, in more ways than one; and it is little wonder that those living near their borders should frequently have been moved to try the language which savages understood, and demand life for life. Even the slaying of the innocent when the guilty could not be reached, might be thought to accord with Indian ideas, since certain of their unwritten laws allowed vicarious suffering.§

*Schoolcraft:vol.V,p.274. +Ibid.,p.280. Also Adair: p.398.- Hist.Coll.of Ga.,vol.III,Part I,p.70. - Ind.Affairs:vol.I,p.325. **Ibid.
++Schoolcraft:vol.V,p.279. Also Adair:p.193. Hist. Coll.of Ga.,vol.III,Part I,p.70. °Ibid.
§Hist.Coll.of Ga.,vol.III,Part I,p.75.

Indian nature seems to have shown as much divergence of character as ^{is found} among any other people. There were those who sought self-interest first, and there were others capable of sacrifice for a chosen cause, devoted in friendship, and loyal under the most discouraging circumstances. Among the Upper Creeks, for instance, the two figures most prominent in politics were Alexander McGillivray and the White Lieutenant. While the former was a marked example of a successful self-seeker, the latter was a man of quite the opposite type, for he was steadfast in loyalty, and his ambition seems to have been wholly for the welfare of his people. Travelers remarked his fine personal appearance, for he ^{was} well-built, of commanding presence, and of benevolent countenance. An admirable orator, and not yet too old for war, he aided the ^{Americans} in planning for the betterment of his tribe. He was one of the leaders in persuading the American agent, Seagrove, to enter his nation, and did so with the belief that his presence in the towns and among the people would help to counteract the Spanish influence. The agent lived, while there, at Tookanatche, where a house was set apart for his use. The town was prominent and central in location, situated on the right bank of the Tallapoosa, not far from the bend to the west.

An attack upon him, imperilling his life, gave the White Lieutenant opportunity for a display of magnanimity

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worthy of the best of any race. For he came to the agent's rescue, notwithstanding the fact that his son had recently been wantonly killed by the whites, and one of the villages of his town had been raided by Georgians just before Seagrove entered the nation.*There were other leaders, too, who, like the White Lieutenant, might be ranked with Booker T. Washington, in their unselfish and large, yet practical views. The Mad Dog of Tuckabatches, and The Big Warrior, who foresaw with President Washington that trade would be the basis of common interest between the two races, were among them.

The danger to Seagrove had arisen from the resentment of Opithlo Mico of Big Talesee, opposite Tuckebatche. Although a friend of the United States during the Revolution, he had, as he felt, been slighted, and consequently drove the agent from his home to refuge in a swamp. Thenceforth his friendship for the United States was not to be counted upon.+ He was an undesirable enemy, too, for he was not of the type to be an inactive one, having even followed a course of fruitless opposition to some of McGillivray's reforms.**

Ocfuskee, the town of the White Lieutenant, and the largest in the nation, was thirty-five miles above Tucke-

*Ind. Affairs: vol. I, pp. 79, 400, 401, 472. Also Schoolcraft: vol. V, p. 255.

+Hist. Coll. of Ga., vol. III, Part I, p. 27. "Pickett: Hist. of Alabama, Vol II, p. 148.

**Schoolcraft: vol. V, p. 281.

batche. It could muster in 1798, four hundred and fifty gun men - a very large quota. Some twenty-three other towns and villages were on the banks of the Tallapoosa, only a few of which were mother towns. Among them may be noted Sawwonogee, a settlement of the Shawnese, and Nauche where the remains of the Natchez tribe were located.

On the Coosau were ten towns. The small and thrifty Tuskegee was near the juncture of the two rivers; two miles above was Ocheaupofau, of special interest as the home of Alexander McGillivray. It was known also as Little Talessee, and by the English translation of the Indian name, as Hickory Ground.* Le Clerc Milfort, a Frenchman in Spanish employ, who rose to prominence among the Creeks prior to this period, upon first visiting the place, thought McGillivray's house very beautiful, compared to those of other Indians. In its near vicinity were the cabins of the sixty negroes in his employ, so that the plantation had the appearance of a small village.+ His father Lachlan McGillivray, a Scotchman, and his wife of noble Indian blood, had established their home a short distance above this place at Old Talesee,** or Apple Grove.° Here Alexander was born,§ and in the near vicinity the two sisters and two daughters who survived him, remained, after

*Hist. Coll. of Ga., vol. III, Part I, p. 39. Also Willett: Nar. of Willett, p. 103. - Ind. Affairs: vol. I, pp. 17-19. Milfort: Voyage en Cr  ck, p. 27. +Ibid.

**Hist. Coll. of Ga., vol. III, Part I, p. 39. °Willett: Nar. of Willett, p. 104. §Ibid.

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his death in 1793. The son was temporarily, at least, consigned to the care of his grandfather in Scotland.*

McGillivray had also a home in Mobile to which he retired when his strongest rival, William Augustus Bowles, gained the ascendancy over so many of the towns that he could no longer direct the nation. The Upper Creeks, as a whole, remained loyal to McGillivray, though Bowles influenced, at times, such leaders as the Mad Dog, the Machez Warrior and the Talesee King. The strength of Bowles' following lay among the Lower Creeks, for, with but one exception, their twelve towns acknowledged his leadership. Cussetah, alone, did not accept him.+The Warrior King of Cussetah commanded the peace towns, and was prominent in his district, yet not sufficiently so, evidently, to control The Hallowing King, of Coweta, governing the war towns, ~~and with~~ Payne, of the Seminoles, and the Uchee King seems to have had much to do with the direction of the affairs of his part of the nation.

Bowles had his home among the Lower Creeks, in the town of the Usuchees, who from the American standpoint, were "all bad."**Yet they were in scarcely worse repute than some of the adjoining towns. Coweta, Broken Arrow, a part of the Uchees, Big Talesee, and part of the Che-

*Hist.Coll.of Ga.,vol.III, Part I,p.39.

+Ind.Affairs:vol.I,pp.246,291.

**Schoolcraft:vol.V,p.263. Also Ind.Affairs:vol.I, pp.79,392.

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haws united with them in resisting the execution of a national decree, by sheltering murderers condemned by their nation.* The Spanish seem to have had a greater hold among them, than with their brethren of the upper rivers, and, on the whole, the more refractory part of the tribe was in this section. Yet the Upper Creeks, with a Shawnese town in their midst to further the schemes of the representatives of their race from the north, and with the hostile Lower Cherokees as near neighbors, were also very troublesome at times.

From 1785 until Wayne's victory, Shawnese ambassadors were from time to time seeking to rouse the southern Indians to union with those north of the Ohio. It has been estimated that six hundred and seventeen Creek warriors joined them.+ They were present in sufficient numbers at any rate, to receive recognition at the treaty negotiations,**and had it not been for the factions existent in each of the four tribes, the union effected by Tecumseh might well have been accomplished in 1793. The ambassadors were given a formal hearing, and had many sympathizers among both Creeks and Cherokees, though neither nation agreed within itself as to the course to be pursued, and Seagrove diligently sought to counteract their

*Ind.Affairs:vol.I,pp.387,394,395,400.

+Pickett's History of Alabama,p.149

**Ind.Affairs:vol.I,p.357.



influence.*

The Cherokee towns, like those of the Creeks, were in two districts, the lower towns at the bend of the Tennessee, and on the head waters of the Coosa; the upper, on the branches of the Tennessee River,- the Little Tennessee, and the Hiawasee, and on the head waters of the Savannah. A part of this tribe moved to the Northwest, and resided temporarily on the waters of the Scioto, but after Wayne's treaty, they returned to their old home.+

Little Turkey was the beloved man of the entire nation, and, had his influence prevailed, the Cherokees would have caused much less trouble than they did. He withstood the influence of the Spaniards, for he did not consider them "real white people;" so, too, he scorned the efforts of the Shawnese to make of him a conspirator for the overthrow of the Americans. When the lower towns refused to follow his counsel, with a last dignified message of disapproval, he told them to go their own way, adding that he would inform Governor Blount of their intentions, and they could settle it with him.**

Among the head men of Little Turkey's town were Boot,^o the Path Killer, the Cabin, the Black Fox and others, leaders in war and peace, of varying degrees of dignity. Second in authority to Little Turkey, were the chiefs of the

*Ind. Affairs: vol. J, pp. 375, 377, 378. +Ibid., p. 582. Also Amer. Hist. Mag. vol. IV, p. 266. And Rep. of Bur. of Eth., 1883-84, p. 164. **Ind. Affairs: vol. J, pp. 271, 471, 461. Amer. Hist. Mag. vol. J, p. 290.



districts. Hanging Maw, or ScAlacutta, at the head of the northern section,*was scarcely less a friend to the Americans than his superior. Chota, his home, was a peace or white town, on the Hiawasee River, a branch of the Tennessee, twenty-five miles below Knoxville.+ From its location, it was convenient to indiscriminating raiding parties. One attack upon it in 1793, pronounced wholly unprovoked, wanton and cruel, by the sober sentiment of the frontier, was the occasion for an uprising of this usually more peaceful part of the nation.**Yet he afterward continued to render valuable services to the United States.

There were five chief towns among the Lower Cherokees, Lookout Mountain town, Nickajack, Running Water, Crow's-town, and Long Island Village. They were located near the bend of the Tennessee River, and were noted not only as being the most hostile part of the nation, but also as the instigators of the Upper Creeks, whose banditti members were always ready to re-inforce their warriors.° Dragging Canoe, their chief under Little Turkey, was generally well affected toward the United States. After his death in 1792, they became especially riotous; White Owl's Son, brother and successor to Dragging Canoe, was of different mind from him, for he had been influenced by the

*Ind. Affairs: vol. I, p. 271. +Ibid., pp. 329, 56, 57.

**Ibid., p. 459.

°Ibid., pp. 262, 264.

*Draper MSS. Md. Jour. Ext. P. 27.
in H. S. P. Ext. Vol. IV.*

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Shawnese. He had killed an officer in the battle against St.Clair, and afterwards brought the war-pipe from Detroit to his own people seeking to rouse them in behalf of the Northwards.* White Owl's Son lived at Lookout Mountain town: here also were a number of prominent disturbers of peace - the Glass, so well versed in deception, that his insincere assertions of peace even deceived Governor Blount;+ the White Man Killer, sufficiently characterized by his name; Double Head, a great rascal,**and Pumpkin Boy, a promising youth of great popularity among the young warriors.° Here, an American agent found material evidence of disaffection. In the house of Richard Justice, a former friend of the United States, he was shown a picture of Bowles with a Cherokee chief on each side of him, inscribed, "Gen.Bowles, Commander-in-chief of the Creek and Cherokee nations." This and other souvenirs indicated that the pretensions of Bowles were given credence⁺⁺. Indeed, he and Willbanks, his associate, worked with no little success among the Lower Cherokees: the latter lived for a time with Dragging Canoe, afterwards, about the time of the treaty of Holston, returning to the Lower Creeks.§

Aside from these five towns, Red-headed Will's town, also called Willstown, was one of the most prominent,

*Ind.Affairs:vol.I,pp.327,328. +Ibid.,pp.291,292.

**Amer.Hist.Mag.,vol.II,p.76. °Ibid.,p.270.


+Ind.Affairs:vol.I,p.264. §Ibid.,p.328.

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and hard to control, because it was on the war-path leading to Cumberland. Bloody Fellow, whose name was changed at the request of the President to General Eskaqua, lived here. This was the home, also, of John Watts, so influential as to be styled at times by Americans, the greatest chief of the nation. He was extremely fickle in his allegiances and like the Glass, a skillful deceiver. Though a signer of the treaty of Holston, he was nevertheless, drawn off by Spanish intrigue: in 1792, he was leader of an attack on Buchanan's Station, designed as a preliminary of the extirpation of Cumberland. Defeated, and severely wounded, he was thereafter changeable, sometimes exerting great influence for the Americans, and again leading raids against them. Captain Handly, captured by his party in 1793, so worked upon the vanity of Watts, that the latter saved him from torture.*

Leaders and factions among the Choctaws were not of much moment to the United States at this period, as they did not go on the war-path against the Americans, and were too far removed from the settlements to share the land contentions, which disturbed the relations with other tribes. They were inclined to friendship with the Chickasaws, and both nations seemed of ready mind to fight the Creeks. They were friendly enough to the United States to

*Ind. Affairs: vol. I, pp. 327, 328, 382, 529, 331, 289. Also Amer. Hist. Mag. vol. II, p. 86.



proffer their forces in the war with the northwestern Indians.

The Chickasaws, generally known as the steadfast friends of the United States, were, nevertheless, broken by factions, one of which was successfully won by Spanish diplomacy and countenanced proceedings disapproved by the other. The Spanish party was led by Ugulaycabe, who received a salary from Carondelet, for the sake of his influence. Through him the Spanish gained a considerable following, and he sought strenuously to turn his nation wholly to their allegiance.*

Probably no more steadfast character is to be found in all history than Payemingo, who opposed him. His career was of vital significance to the Indian relations of the time. The Spaniards were especially concerned about this nation because it was the barrier between the Mississippi River, and the Cumberland and Kentucky settlements, from which an advance to the river was continually anticipated. They consequently offered great inducements to unfaithfulness ^{toward the} Americans. Yet friendly chiefs, led by Payemingo, were loyal and were able to so fully control the situation, that the frontier people regarded the Chickasaws as their best friends during the period. Payemingo was sagacious, progressive and active. Moreover,

*Draper Coll., Clark MSS., 42 A, *Gayoso to Carondelet*.
July 23, 1793



he credited his chosen people with as great loyalty to his interests, as he had to theirs, as is shown by his appeal to Washington in 1795, in behalf of his daughter's education. He led two hundred warriors to aid against the northern Indians, gave information of impending raids, and in every way made his attitude so unmistakable, that Indians and whites alike came to realize that he could not be turned from his attachment.*

Other leaders among the Indians are worthy of note, but those presented will serve to indicate the bearing of Indian politics upon the failure of the various agencies which strove at times to unite the tribes in opposition to American expansion. There were always leading chiefs of American sympathies who wielded sufficient influence to prevent concerted action in that direction. Had there not been strong individualities among them, the balance of power, which they held by virtue of their location between two nations with minds on the same goal of the Mississippi Valley, would have been of more telling effect.

The possibilities were understood by the nations, and political dominance became the object of their Indian diplomacy.

*Amer.Hist.Mag.vol.IV,p.72. Also Draper's Notes, Md. Journal, Oct.18,1793, Ind.Affairs,vol.I,p.442.

*New paper
extracts vol. 12*



CHAPTER II.

Efforts of Spain to Gain a Controlling Influence
Over the Four Tribes.

The Spanish domains within the present boundaries of the United States were divided for purposes of government into the provinces of Louisiana and West Florida, under one governor-general, and East Florida. In the latter province during this period, the chief powers were vested in Juan Nepomucena de Quesada, Esq., with full title of Colonel of the Royal Army, Governor General, Commander and Royal Vice Protector of the province and king.* With similar title and the added office of intendant, Francois Louis Hector, Baron de Carondelet assumed control of Louisiana and West Florida on June 1, 1792, and to him fell the jurisdiction of the Indian protectorate.

As governor-general, he was the head of the army and militia, and president of the provincial council, and further had the superintendence of Indian affairs and exercised judicial functions; as intendant he had charge of the departments of finance and of commerce.+ In the exercise of these large powers, he was responsible to Don Luis de las Casas, the captain-general residing in

*Amer.State Papers,Foreign Relations,vol.I,p.269.
+Account of Louisiana,1803.p.38.



Havana, and to the home government. Aside from the districts of Natchez and Pensacola, which had special governments, the subdivisions of the territory, districts or parishes, were under the control of commandants chosen from the militia or army, with whom a civil officer was at times allied.

The one regiment regularly allowed for the defense of the province was of necessity distributed in twenty-one detachments through a region extended over six hundred leagues; aside from this, there were only militia forces composed largely of those of other than Spanish sympathies, and a possibility of re-inforcements from Havana. * °Indeed, the poorly defended state of Louisiana left it so open to conquest, that George Rogers Clark asserted his ability to successfully invade it with 1500 men,† and an unknown writer, contemplating the expedition, thought that 500, rightly managed, would suffice.§


Carondelet entered upon his office with a due sense of these difficulties, yet with an abundance of self-confidence, and a purpose of zealous devotion to the conservation of what he deemed one of the most important of His Majesty's possessions.** He saw at once the

*Rep. of Hist. MSS. Com. Vol. J, p. 997.

°Amer. Hist. Association 1896. P. 1054 and 1055.

†Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. J, p. 969. §Ibid. p. 972.

**Draper Coll., Clark MSS., Vol. 42 A. Carondelet to Alcudia. Oct. 4, 1795, and Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., Vol. J, p. 977.



importance of the Indians in aiding him to control the situation, could he but control them, and took measures to this end. By the close of the first year, he had established an agent among them, and had renewed treaties with the four nations.

Events developed in a way to emphasize the necessity of holding them by the strongest possible alliance, when, after Spain had declared war upon France in February, 1793, the suspicions that French agents were planning the reconquest of Louisiana, became certainty. The only hope of repelling such an invasion was by Indian forces. Carondelet felt strongly, that if the enemy succeeded in detaching them, nothing could prevent the total devastation, and , probably, the loss of the province.* In addition to this impending danger, the ambitious designs of the westerners were thought a continual menace.

Though Carondelet seems to have been prone to inform the home government of the magnitude of dangers before he fully understood them, yet, in certain ways, he interpreted truly, the frontier spirit. When in 1795, he accused the Americans of the purpose of driving the Indians west of the Mississippi, and appropriating their lands,+ he anticipated the facts of history by thirty

*Hist.MSS.Com.Rep.,vol.I,p.1039.

+Draper Coll.,Clark MSS.,42 A, June 13,1795. Carondelet to Las Casas.

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


years. Yet the westward migrations foreshadowed this climax of Indian affairs, though the project itself, had probably at that time entered no mind but his own. Foreseeing with remarkable clearness the results of "natural expansion," he maintained strenuously the policy of restraining the frontier, for he believed that if the Americans once gained posts upon the Mississippi, nothing could prevent, not only their control of this, but an advance into the territory beyond, even to the mines of Mexico and Peru.* If this could not be checked, an alternative remained of drawing off the West from the United States, to allegiance with Spain - a bold design which he pursued with great tenacity of purpose, declaring himself sponsor for its accomplishment, if sufficient funds could be provided, as late as 1795,†and seeking to achieve it with unabated zeal, even after the Pinckney treaty, might have been supposed to have ended intrigue.

By varied machinations, he sought to make the control of the Indians so real as to enable him to use them to these ends. The power of threatening the scourge of a savage war, or of offering the allurements of a guaranteed peace along the frontier, would heighten the in-

*Amer.Hist.Rev.,Vol.II,p.476.

†Draper Coll.,Clark MSS.,42 A, Carondelet to Alcudia, July 1,1795.



fluence of Spain with the western settlements, and add new links to the chain by which she sought to bind western interests closely to those of Louisiana. Meanwhile in arousing the Indians themselves to their own interests in defending their lands from encroachment, lay the one hope of preventing the American advance toward the Mississippi. With a view of these possibilities he wrote in 1793:

"There is no force which can shelter from the devastation of 15000 well-armed savages, two hundred and more leagues of frontier, now venture to descend the Mississippi, leaving their communications cut off by a swarm of savages...Not only will Spain always make the American settlements tremble by threatening them with the Indians, but it has no other means of being able to molest them...Indian nations are the best defence of these provinces and form by themselves an army of 15000 men, whose keeping in time of peace will cost not more than \$50,000, in time of war not more than \$150,000."

In her progress with the Indians, Spain had early been fortunate in having attached to her interests the "only means of approach" to the strongest nation among them, Alexander McGillivray, a Scotch half-breed, an astute politician, and for many years the acknowledged leader of the Creeks. But by the beginning of the year

*Draper Coll. MSS., Clark MSS., 42 A, Canondelet to Al-
cudia, Sept. 27, 1793.



1793, so many influences had been working upon the Indians, that his power was on the wane, and the Creeks and the other nations as well, were in a state of the utmost confusion regarding ruling leaders and counsels.

McGillivray at this time not only held a commission and salary under Spain, and a partnership in the Scotch firm which monopolized the Indian trade, but had likewise become a salaried officer of the United States. He had lost his controlling hold upon his people, partly through his efforts to serve many masters, and partly through the worship of successful rivals.*

Among those responsible for the distractions, William Augustus Bowles, a free-booter, claiming to be an agent of England, had held prominent place. By Spanish strategem and much to the satisfaction of the Americans, he had been captured in the spring of 1792, yet the "talks of the lying captain" had sown seeds of dissatisfaction, of which the fruits were still reaped by all parties concerned with this field of intrigue.[?] He had undermined the influence of McGillivray, had robbed the trading firm to the extent of something like 2000 pounds, with which he had made friends to his own cause, and had contributed largely to the failure of the American plans.

*Indian Affairs, v.J, pp.15- and Pickett:History of Alabama, v.J, pp.61 ff.



By deceitful representations he had persuaded many of the Indians that the English had not ceded the lands occupied by the Creeks and Cherokees, to the United States, and that men and arms could be obtained in England to defend them.*

After his capture, his white associates remained in the nation, one, Willbanks, apparently being the leader. Bowles was allowed to write to him and kept alive the hope of a return, with the promised goods, men and arms. In February, 1793, Willbanks was plying a brisk Indian trade under the combined colors of England and the Indians. He represented that the packets he received from the Bahamas, were from the Great Father over the water. In the latter part of May he accompanied the Shawnee warriors to the North, and at Detroit had an interview with Simcoe, reporting what he knew of Indian conditions in the Southwest. While primarily among the Creeks in the interests of trade, and not as an authorized agent of England, he seems to have made himself useful to the English, since he had communications with tory leaders when war was impending between England and Spain. The fact that Simcoe advanced him ten pounds for return ex-

*Indian Affairs, Vol. J, pp. 264, 296, 303, 297, 439, 454.

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penses suggests that his presence among the Indians was not thought undesirable by British authorities.* Intestine wars added to the confused state of affairs. The Cherokees were besieged by runners from the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks at one time, for aid in their inter-tribal conflicts, and Shawnee representatives were meanwhile seeking re-inforcements for the northern Indians from among them all.+ Moreover, the Creek nation was divided within itself on the question of acquiescence in the boundary line of the treaty of 1790, and factional war was threatened. Nor was the government within any tribe strong enough to hold the members to a common course, nor the power of the chiefs sufficient to restrain young warriors from unauthorized attacks upon the settlements. External counsels added new perplexities; they were utterly unable to comprehend the relation of state and nation; the words of the agent and the deeds of frontiersmen could frequently not be reconciled, and Spanish talks were undoubtedly stronger than the policy of the government would justify; when prompted by the interest of trade. Influential agents

*Mich. Pioneer Coll., vol. XXIV, p. 574.

+Indian Affairs, vol. I, pp. 431, and vol. II, p. 438.

°Draper Coll. MSS., Clark MSS., 42 A, Canondelet to Gayoso, Aug. 15, 1793.

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from either nation might have restored order to Bedlam, but with agents from both, more often than not, working against each other, confusion grew worse confounded, as tribes divided in their foreign allegiances. And yet a new influence developed in 1793, in the efforts on the part of the French to detach the four tribes from the Spanish.

Like all nations that at any time had dreams of the conquest of Louisiana, the French were awake to the importance of Indian co-operation, and it was counted upon in the projects developed under Minister Genet, against Louisiana and West Florida.

Hammond, of Georgia, was commissioned to treat with the Upper and Lower Creeks, and Tate of South Carolina, with the Cherokees and Chickasaws.* Both of these men were subordinates of Mangourit, consul at Charleston, who was organizing the eastern part of the expedition.+ Hammond wrote to Mangourit "I am convinced that it will not only be easy to engage the Creeks to favor our expedition against the South, but that upon this depends the safety and success of our enterprise." It was hoped to win them from Spanish attachment by gifts, and by

*Hist. MSS. Com. Report, vol. II, p. 623. (A. H. A. 1897)

+Ibid, p. 571.

*Ibid, pp. 595, 597.



the attraction of the French name. It is interesting to note that the revolutionary call of liberty and equality was sounded to savage as well as to civilized nations of the time.

They were exhorted to unite against kings, and to repudiate all treaties made with the monarchs of England and Spain, to whose ambition and cupidity all the evils of the Indians were to be attributed. By the proposed treaties the French would have become mediators of the difficulties between the Indians and the United States, and would have had the two nations in perfect peace.* Because of the calling off of the expedition,+ Indians were not led into active service, but French agents were at work during these months preparing them to join France and the United States, to the detriment of Spain.

In all the rivalry to secure a dominating influence, Spain had certain advantages. First, she had no desire for more lands. This was the one resource which she enjoyed to satiety in the New World, and such cessions as she asked of the Indians were for forts which would serve the purpose of protecting them in their own possessions. Second, the priority of her treaties gave her

*Hist. MSS.Com.Rep.,vol.II,p.623.

+Ibid,p.629.



a way of approach before the French had sought, or the Americans had found one. To the protectorate established by the treaty of 1784, her representatives clung tenaciously, upon its basis, opposing the right of other nations to make treaties of alliance, regarding effort on the part of the United States to gain footing as "contrary to the principles existing between nations, that each power should deal with the nations under its protection, without interfering in the affairs of the other^x."

The question arises, upon what grounds did Spain base so sweeping an assumption to control a population resident within territories which by an important international treaty had been ceded to another nation than herself? The argument of her long continued protest to the cession need be but briefly recapitulated. She had, with slight variations, declared the claim of the United States to the southern boundary of 31°, invalid, and to demonstrate this, pursued two lines of discussion. First, her own treaty of adjustment with Great Britain, ratified January 30, 1783, had secured to her the provinces of East and West Florida without definition of the northern boundary. By the proclamation of 1763, England had first set apart the latter, with the north-

*Draper MSS., 42 A, Carondelet to Gayoso, Aug. 15, 1793.
✓ -Ibid., Sept. 2, 1795.
Ibid., Nov. 1, 1795, Carondelet to Alcudia.



ern boundary of 31°; in the next year, to include settlements supposed to lie beyond this line, she had extended the jurisdiction of the governor of the district, to latitude of the mouth of the Yazoo River, 32° 28'. Spain demanded this boundary for her newly acquired territory, as this was the West Florida existing in 1783. Her second line of argument was, that Spain, as an ally of France, had, during the Revolution, declared war against England, and had reduced the British ports on the Mississippi River. She affected much indignation, therefore, that England should cede territory not in possession, but lost to her by the conquest of another. Moreover, the secret article of the English American treaty, by which Great Britain provided, that, in case she retained West Florida, the boundary should be the line of 1764, intensified Spain's vehemence in supporting her case.*

The United States had no thought at any time of yielding to this view. On her part she pleaded Georgia's charter, recognized when the line of 31° was fixed in organizing her western territory, by the proclamation of 1763, and confirmed by the preliminary treaty of No-

*Secret Journal of Congress, vol.IV, pp.63 ff. Also Foreign Relations, vol.J, pp.259 ff., and Amer.Hist.Assoc'n. Rep. pp.337-348.



vember 30,1782, and the final one of Sept.3, 1783. But if, prior to the Revolution, the territory did not belong to the colonies, then it belonged to Great Britain. This country had yielded it. The provisions of the preliminary treaty were known to Spain when on June 20,1783, she had accepted the Floridas, and Minorca, and had agreed to restore, without compensation, all other territories won during the war. A protest to prior cessions should have been made then, to be of any force; by the ratification she had acquiesced in the then established northern boundary of 31°.*

But granted the utmost limit which historically belonged to West Florida, or which Spain had taken by conquest, and still she would have owned but one third of the land occupied by the four nations. Yet by the theory which her agents defended for fourteen years, her northernmost chiefs and tribes were as much under her protection as those south of 32°28'.

In an interview between Jay and the Count D'Aranda, the latter stated the principle that if Spanish right did not extend over all the territory, still it was possessed by free and independent nations of Indians,whose

*Foreign Relations,vol.I,p.252.
Ibid,p.252 ff.



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lands the Americans could not, with any propriety, consider as belonging to them.* Granted this, then the protectorate of Spain, established with the "free and spontaneous will of the tribe concerned"+ must certainly have been infringed upon by the late dealings of the United States. But the view was extreme and unsubstantial; it was inconsistent with the attitude of other nations and with Spain's own procedure in Mexico and Peru.° It was resorted to merely as a temporary expedient when necessary to supplement the territorial claim. Thus Gayoso, Governor of Natchez, pleaded the theory in the purchase of Barrancas de Marga~~nt~~ from the Chickasaws, in latitude 35° north, and hence unquestionably beyond Spanish limits. He assumed that the lands belonged to the Indians and treated with them as free people.**

The United States conceded the idea of Indian sovereignty, but with modifications. At this period, treaties were made under constitutional provisions, the right of each tribe to control its own hunting grounds - to keep or dispose of them - was not denied, and for

*Correspondence of Jay, vol. II, p.387. (Johnston, 1891).

+Foreign Relations, vol. I, p.278.

°Royce, Indian Cessions in U.S., p.539.

**Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. I, p.1094.



fifty years after, the political independence and integrity of the tribes was accepted as proper, and protected. But as against other nations, she assumed sovereignty, i.e., a protectorate politically, with the pre-emption right of territory.* This was by virtue of the tribes being within her borders, and hence on this side, the controversy could not be dissociated from the boundary question. When all else failed, Spain denied the right of the United States to control Indian territory and pleaded the sovereign nation theory. Jefferson expressed the willingness to leave things in status quo, allowing both nations the same privileges with the Indians, pending the decision of the boundary.+ Spain was far more arbitrary, demanding that because of her protectorate, the United States keep hands off.

To force this by Spanish arms, was no part of Carondelet's task. Spain was not strong enough in the New World, nor was this consistent with the diplomatic temporizing of the home government where the hope apparently was entertained of gaining re-inforced strength eventually, by the drawing off of the West, or by some new international combination.

The policy outlined by Las Casas in 1794, is repre-

*Correspondence of Jay, vol.II, p.392, (Johnston, 1891).
+Jefferson's Works, vol.VI, p.33, (Ford).



sentative: "To interest in the most lively manner, the Indian nations in defending their lands rigorously, helping them secretly as long as this remains possible... and openly when this becomes inevitable."*

That this policy in its mildest workings threatened disaster to the frontier is evident, since, considering the American claim to a pre-emption right to the soil, and the Georgians' desire for expansion, there could be little hope that it would remain in-operative. And the Indian nature and government made it easy for tribes to forswear their treaties, and having received the purchase price of land, to appose its occupation.

Certain factors in the situation, moreover, encouraged the use of the prescribed methods, beyond the intentions of the home government. Carondelet was prone to alarm, and was capable of turning the fury of his allies against the frontiersmen, when their aggressive purpose was merely a spectre of his imagination. Las Casas, also, was misled once, at least, for he misinterpreted the occupation of Ft. Massac. The Chickasaws would have been aroused to attack it, by agreement of the two Spanish generals, had not Gayoso prevented this strange freak of military strategy, by giving proofs

* *Hist. MSS. Com. Rep.*, vol. I, p. 1083. (A. N. C., 1891.)



that Wayne's presence there, was to protect Spanish territory from unauthorized American invaders.*Further, subordinate agents at work among the Indians, had personal ends to attain. The interests of the Spanish, and of trade often coincided; when they did not, traders were not discriminating in the matter. On the question of the Indian attitude toward the Americans, they were not wholly in accord. There was nothing to be gained by Spain by a war between the Indians and the United States. On the contrary, there was much reason to fear the outcome. So far as government authority could color "Spanish talks," the Indians were urged to war only on the defensive - to be at peace if possible, but to keep their lands. But war would turn Indian trade wholly from the United States, and into other channels. Consequently those interested in accomplishing this, were tempted beyond the bounds set by Spain in inciting the tribes with which they were dealing.

The house of Panton, Leslie and Co., situated at Pensacola, had obtained privileges of the Spanish government which gave them a large control over this trade. William Panton, a Scotch refugee from Georgia, had supplied goods to the English Indian Superintendent during the war, and had influence which well served the in-


* Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. II, p. 1079. (A. K. C., 1897)



terests of the house. So extensively and effectively was it exerted that the "Spaniards and Panton" were more often than not jointly held responsible for movements among the Indians adverse to the Americans. The attachment of McGillivray as a member of the firm, strengthened the hold upon the Creeks. After his death on February 17, 1793, it was even thought that Panton would succeed to his leadership of the tribe. Though this did not result, he was none the less active among them, and gained the co-operation of Governor O'Neal, the Spanish commandant of Pensacola, who was credited among the Americans with an interest in the firm. They delivered arms and ammunition to the Indians, with the suggestion that they might better be used to shoot Americans than deer, and encouraged them to bring in scalps. As the result of the destruction of the American store-house on the St. Mary's which they had investigated, they were enabled to learn from the captured books, the amount of business which the merchant was drawing away from them.* Several murders were committed in accomplishing this deed, and Panton diligently worked among the Creeks to prevent them from giving the Americans the satisfaction demanded.+ As the event restrained the American Indian

*Ind. Affairs, vol. I, pp. 458, 378, 379, 454, 463,

+Ibid, pp. 389, 394.



agent for a time, from going to the interior of the nation, the enterprise worked for the interests of Spain, in one way, though evidently not authorized by her. Gayoso disavowed any knowledge of the act; Carondelet failed to understand it, and because of it, would have refused to the Indians, requested supplies.^q That Carondelet himself, did actively instigate the Indians, in accordance with the general tenor of his instructions from time to time, is conclusively shown by his correspondence with Viar and Jandenes,+ and by the report made to the home government, in Sept., 1795. He included in this, items of expense in arming the Indians for opposing the fulfillment of the treaty of 1790, and stated that by this course, he had compelled the United States to desist from their pretensions to the Creek territory.^o Soon after assuming control of the province, he had appointed an agent, and through the presence of this Don Pedro Olivier among the tribes, and the offices of Colonel Milfort, a French attache of Spain, who acted as the agent's alternate,**he was enabled to affect his purposes. This instigation of the Creeks which he admits

*Indian Affairs, vol. I, p. 454, also, Amer. Hist. *Mag.*, vol. II, p. 365, and Draper Coll., Clark MSS., 42 A, Carondelet to Gayoso, Aug. 15, 1793.

+Foreign Relations, vol. I, p. 269.

^oDraper MSS., 42 A, Carondelet to Alcudia, Sept. (5) 1795.

**Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. I, p. 1052. (*a. H. Q. 1596*)



was continued throughout this period, seems to have been worked with sufficient adroitness to puzzle leaders among the frontiersmen.

From the fall of 1793 until late in the next year, at least, the American agents were impressed with the idea that Spain was promoting peace.* Yet in July, 1794, Carondelet suggested to Alcudia the undesirability of a settled peace between the United States and the Indians, and assured him that it could at any time be prevented "with a few thousand opportunely applied, without the United States being able to complain of us."† To keep affairs in unstable equilibrium was better suited to his needs, than either peace or war.

During 1793, affairs grew so serious that the latter course seemed to the American statesmen and frontiersmen alike, the inevitable one.** The French and American attack upon Louisiana was impending at this time, and from the double need of forming a stronger defensive alliance among the Indians for the protection of their lands, and of securing their aid for the preservation of Louisiana, a conference of the four nations with the Spanish was arranged. Representatives assembled at Nogales

*Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. J, p. 1036.

**Jefferson's Writings, vol. VI, p. 322 (Ford).



by invitation, and on Oct.28, a treaty was concluded, accomplishing in large part what Spain had desired. One plan had been to unite the nations through a permanent common congress, with the hope, that ruled by a common council, a solid front might be opposed to the United States if war should be declared against any one tribe. For Carondelet's fear was, that the United States would gain the end sought by annihilating the tribes singly, as occasion or excuse offered. Such a congress was declared impracticable by the Indians, because of the nomadic propensities of some of the tribes. As strong a defensive alliance as the Indian nature, organization, and tribal dissensions permitted, was concluded, however, including a mutual guaranty of lands.* They were inspired with "pacific intentions toward the United States."†This was good diplomacy at so critical a juncture: Spain expected to need her allies for her own defense soon, and did not wish them to be engaged elsewhere; she hoped that this evidence of her good offices, would have a salutary effect upon the Americans, in deterring them from giving the French preference, from the attraction of their Indian policy;‡and, having failed in

*Draper Coll., Clark MSS., 42 A, Gayoso to Carondelet, Dec. 6, 1793.

†Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. J, p. 1038.

‡Ibid, p. 1039. Note 1.



uniting the tribes as completely as ^{she} had anticipated, believed them not in a condition to withstand an American war. The provision is not to be taken as indicating any change in the general policy, as the letters above cited, show.

Carondelet felt the treaty to be of great immediate importance, for at no time had his need of allies seemed more desperate. There was practically nothing within his own military resources, to check the anticipated expedition, about to descend upon Louisiana by way of the Ohio. New Madrid and St. Louis could together oppose but 290 men of combined regular and militia forces; these captured, the artillery taken would aid in taking Nogales, and the way to the capital would be opened. As a result of this successful negotiation, however, he expected to be able to use the Cherokees and Chickasaws to re-enforce the northern posts, and felt that if they remained loyal, the enemy would have great difficulty in making progress.* There were signs of activity, from the latter part of 1793, among the Americans which convinced Carondelet that the United States was determined to draw off the Indians at any cost. The agent Seagrove was now living among the Creeks temporarily and his influence was realized and feared. He had openly urged the tribe

*Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. J p. 1027, Carondelet to Alcudia.



to throw off the Spanish yoke, and had deterred them from co-operating with the governor of Pensacola in his defensive preparations.* Moreover, in December, 1793, Washington had proposed to Congress a plan for trade with the four nations,+ and this was not at all to be desired.

Ever fertile in resource, the governor general proposed a counter expedient of a pecuniary war through the house of Panton, and an increase of gifts, with the view of wearying the rivals of the fruitless expense, and compelling them to give up the attempt to maintain trade at the expense of the public treasury. With vacillating Indians, disloyal inhabitants, and frontier states impatient of the exclusion policy, he felt that the smallest expedition under the auspices of the convention would be formidable, and that the insufficiency of troops made the necessity of such a move as this, for holding the Indians, imperative. In the stress of such circumstances, he turned for aid to England, evolving the far reaching scheme, in which Simcoe was unable to co-operate, of a mutual guaranty.** England and Spain had at this time, a common foe in France, and the American interests of

*Hist.MSS.Com.Rep.,vol.J,p.1052.

*Richardson:Messages of President,vol.J,p.141.

+Hist.MSS.Com.Rep.,vol.J,p.1055.

**Ebid. p.1066.



each were in part, unstable. In the Northwest, England had found the Indians as adaptable to her needs as had Spain in the Southwest, and had pursued the same system - less vigorously, only because her needs were not so great. It was now proposed to exchange fur-trading interests for a guaranty of Spanish American lands.

So delicately balanced were the international interests of the United States at this time, that none could foretell how the scales would turn. With all nations, affairs were either in turmoil, or process of adjustment. To contemporaries, who knew not the strength and steadiness of Washington, who interpreted events, as Carondelet seems usually to have done, by the popular feeling, and had not grasped the significance of the unproven, conservative central government nor its power to eventually control the trend of national affairs, an alliance between France and the United States seemed highly probable. With somewhat similar dangers threatening both England and Spain in America as well as in Europe, what more natural than that they should combine for mutual advantage. "The United States would never dare undertake an invasion of Louisiana, by the Ohio, leaving in wake of the expedition, forces of Canada and warlike Indian tribes dependent on England, nor to attack Canada, their



army being menaced in the rear by our savage nations, whom we can easily stir up to action by a sum of \$100,000 of extra annual appropriation."*

This was Carondelet's largest project for the salvation of his province in the midst of threatening ills, and is a credit to his statesmanship. The possibly fatal significance of such a combination to the United States and the consequent dread of just this turn of affairs, will be shown in the next chapter.

Late in 1794, renewed war between the Creeks and Chickasaws alarmed Spain lest it result in the destruction of the Indians, thus enabling the Americans to reach the coveted goal by an easy path. The American Indian agent, Seagrove, was known to be hopeful of establishing harmonious relations with the Creeks and was yet negotiating with them. Carondelet assumed that land hunger was stimulating the Americans to foment war - Seagrove, on the one side, by granting munitions and men; Blount and Robertson on the other, by instigating the Chickasaws, and encouraging them also, by promises of national aid. On June 13, 1795, he consequently made an unusually strong appeal for funds and re-enforcements, that he might sustain his fortifications, and have means to dissuade the Chickasaws from joining the Choctaws.

*Hist.MSS.Com.Rep.,vol.I,p.1065.



He asserted that the Americans were on the verge of success. To sustain the allied nations in the possession of their lands becomes indispensable both for the conservation of Louisiana, and for keeping the Americans from the navigation of the Gulf.**

Notwithstanding the scarcity of resources, a long cherished desire was accomplished in the occupation of Barrancas de Margo or Chickasaw Bluffs, near the present location of Memphis. As it was an admirable strategic point for an enemy to seize to cut communications by river between the Spanish forts, and was at the head of the Indian country, Carondelet and Gayoso had read into the American movements a determination to occupy it.+ The fact that it was used as a distributing point for supplies to the Chickasaws, gave rise to reports by travellers down the Mississippi of American flat-boats, of camp-fires, and even of a promise on the part of Payen-ingo to cede it to the Americans in return for their aid.**Carondelet considered the establishment of Americans here, so fatal to the security of the province that he determined to anticipate them at any cost. As early as the summer of 1793, Gayoso started negotiations to

*Draper Coll., Clark MSS., 42 A, Carondelet to Alcudia, June 13, 1795.

+Ibid. Gayoso to Carondelet, Sept. 12, 1795.

**Ibid. Carondelet to Gayoso, Aug. 15, 1795.



obtain it eventually, and meanwhile to incite the Chickasaws to deny it to the Americans.* By January, 1794, he had attempted by fine diplomacy, to gain an invitation from the Chickasaws to establish a trading post there. But "this was their favorite hunting ground, old Payemataka and his predecessors had determined never to permit whites to settle there, which determination they had maintained even at the price of blood, and the warriors at present were of the same way of thinking."†

Failing in this method, they proceeded as in the case of Nogales, to establish themselves and afterwards settle accounts with the natives. It proved an arduous and costly task, requiring five months time, and an expenditure of \$1700, besides extra presents to the Chickasaws to the amount of \$6000, and severely taxing Gayoso's resources, physical, financial and diplomatic.** Uguluyacabe was at the place when the expedition arrived there, whether by accident or design. As he was the most friendly disposed of all the chiefs to the Spaniards, he was easily led to see the "good reasons" which prompted the cutting of trees and construction of a fort on ground

*Draper Coll., Clark MSS., 42 A, Gayoso to Carondelet, July 25, 1793.

†Ibid., Jan. 24, 1794.

**Ibid. Reserved Communication, No. 15, p. 48.




so long sacred to the Indian needs. Later, Gayoso was waited upon by the king himself, with a large following, who came to ask the reasons for his intrusion.

For its local coloring and as an illustration of Spanish finesse in Indian diplomacy, the interview is unsurpassed. Like the Gauls before the Romans, they were awed by the daring and boldness of the enterprise."They told me they had come from their villages to see me in a place where they could never have believed any white man could dare to have established himself," but though they had always opposed this,"they saw the appearance of the place so much altered that it seemed to them to be only attributable to the Great Spirit which they dared not oppose so that they congratulated themselves on its being I who found myself there."Gayoso set forth at length the nature of French military operations, giving them an interpretation which suited the needs of the occasion. Silenced whether convinced or not, they submitted to his retaining the post.*


There is no evidence whatever that the Americans contemplated occupying the place. As a matter of fact, both Blount and Robertson were at this time far more concerned with local protection than with advancing the frontier. The termination of the Genet affair, and the

*Draper Coll., Clark MSS., 42 A, Gayoso to Carondelet, Reserved Communication, No. 15.



summary despossession of Elijah Clarke from the Oconee lands, by order of the Government, might have sufficed to satisfy Carondelet of the power of the United States to deal with lawless infractions of such a nature, and certainly there had been no suggestion that Congress would sanction it. Jefferson had officially disavowed any such intention;*there had been no effort to hold by force the territory claimed by the United States, but on the contrary the Government had expressed and adhered to the disposition, against strong state opposition, to leave territorial claims in abeyance, until a treaty should set things right. Carondelet, as is clear in other instances, did not comprehend the frontier question in its relations to the federal government. Long dealing with frontiersmen susceptible to bribery, and actuated by local rather than national sentiments, apparently had disqualified him to grasp the situation in its full significance. Knowing the importance of the Mississippi to the entire West, he acted upon the principle that all who were not intriguing with Spain to gain its privileges, by secession from the United States, were intriguing against Spain to obtain it by continued subtlety and force. Considering the depleted resources of the province, the cost of the expedition and its needless-

*Ford: Writings of Jefferson, pp. 331 ff.



ness, the conception of this plan, if prompted by the alleged motives, was a marked instance of ill-timed zeal.

If, as may have been the case, it was a part of a general plan to gain for Spain as many posts as possible in order to strengthen her prospects when difficulties should be adjusted, it was certainly wholly unwarranted, in time of peace. Blount characterized it in strong terms of condemnation.* Wayne thought it an act of war and wrote to Gayoso challenging the action.+ The American faction of the Chickasaws appealed to their friends, and were encouraged to believe the intrusion would be resented by the government,**

But negotiations at Madrid had effected the Pinckney treaty of Oct 27, 1795. Prospects were strong for the surrendering of all of the posts, and the act was not therefore protested by force. Events proved however, that the Spanish capacity for temporizing was far from exhausted, and the territory was not evacuated until March 30, 1798.°


It may be noted that when the finale to the long effort to draw off Kentucky was reached, and a provisional treaty was submitted to the leaders of the secession movement there in 1796, by Carondelet, the Indian question received due

* Amer. Hist. Mag., vol.IV, p.272.

+ Hist. MSS., Com.Rep. vol.II, p.1091.

**Amer. Hist. Mag., vol.III, p.394.


° Amer. Hist. Assoc'n. Rep., 1893, p.364.



attention. It was provided that in case the new government should deem it necessary at any time to reduce the Indian nations and extend its dominion over them, compelling them to submit to its constitution and laws, His Majesty would heartily concur and co-operate in attaining this desirable end.*

Spain's theory of a protested sovereignty thus appears to have ^{been} raised wholly for effect, since when the Indians were no longer useful as friends, she counted them fair prey for conquest.

* Gayerre; History of Louisiana, p.360.



CHAPTER III.

The American Peace Policy, and the Difficulties Attending its Achievement.

It has been shown that while the United States recognized the independent nationality of the Indian tribe, she yet claimed for herself the sole right of pre-emption and protectorate. As a further preliminary to an understanding of the complicated difficulties of these years, the domestic opposition aroused by this view should be considered.

From the time when the charters defining the limits of the seaboard colonies were given, to the final acquisition of the then western lands by the United States, one period of French control of these lands had intervened, and yet another of organization by the English Crown, without regard to the original colonial boundaries.

Yet after the cession made by the Treaty of Paris, in 1783, the separate states returned to their charter claims. In the case of Georgia, this meant an extension westward to the Mississippi, between the parallels of 31° and 35°. Hence the lands of three of the four tribes would fall within her boundaries. The question of the validity of this was not brought to an issue with the general government until 1797, when the agitation over the Yazoo



sales aroused Congress to a special investigation of the subject. Until this time, the dispute between state and nation did not concern itself with the legal title to the land. The problem was the more perplexing one of states' rights, in their bearing upon Indian relations.

By the Articles of Confederation, the central government attempted to assume the direction of Indian affairs, but Article X, provided that the legislative powers of the state should not be thereby infringed. Under a proclamation of 1783, all persons were prohibited from receiving a cession of Indian lands without the authority of Congress.* Larger powers, and an executive to enforce them, strengthened the position assumed under the Confederation, and nationalists at least, saw in the powers granted to Congress and the President full latitude for the dictation of the Indian policy. In the treaty made in 1790 with the Creeks, the latter bound themselves to hold no treaty with an individual state, and both here and in the treaty with the Cherokees in 1791, a guarantee was made by the United States of all territories not ceded.² No Georgia commissioners were present in either instance.³ Such principles and procedure ran counter to the ideas of Georgia.³ She denied the right of the nation to

* Royce: Indian Land Cessions in the U. S., p.640.

² See later citations.

³ Indian Affairs, vol. 1, p.412.



control territory within the bounds of the state; consequently treaties negotiated without the sanction of Georgia commissioners which had to do with her lands, were null; a guarantee to the Indians of such lands by the United States was a gross infringement upon the pre-emptive rights which she claimed for herself. * In short the sovereignty and legislative rights retained, required that the United States keep hands off from any initiative in the Indian problem of the state. + To the nation belonged the task of dealing with Spain, and dispossessing her of Georgian territory, ~~was the only phase which concerned the nation~~, for Spain was a sovereign power; Georgia did not acknowledge that such was the status of Indian tribes. Rather, the fact that they had been conquered in war, ^{that} ~~and~~ their lands might be held forfeit, and the general law that savagery must yield to civilization, placed them in the position of tenants at will. They might, therefore, be dispossessed at such time and by such methods as the state should determine.**

While this view became somewhat modified in practice, from the necessities of the case, yet it was a source of continual friction between the two authorities. Its extreme application allowed the famous Yazoo sales of 1789,

* Amer. Hist. Assoc'n. Rep., 1901, vol.2, p.43.

+ Amer. State Papers, Ind. Affairs, vol.1, pp.553, 412, 17.

** Ibid., p.500. also Amer. Hist. Assoc'n. Rep., vol.2, p.43.



and of 1795, by which Georgia would have easily shifted the care of those for whom according to her own theory, she should have been responsible.

By the latter of these grants, three fourths of the Indian lands were conveyed to large land companies, with no regard to the fact that they were occupied, and under guarantee of the United States., Section 18 of the Act of Jan. 7, 1793, transferred to the grantees and purchasers the obligation of preserving peace with the Indians and of extinguishing claims to the territory.*

Therepudiation of the proceeding by the subsequent legislature was brought about by entirely other considerations than the right of the red man. It prevented, however, the necessity for repressive measures proposed by Congress⁺, for maintenance of the good faith of the nation. Aside from this ill fated move, the attitude of Georgia during the period found expression in protests against the action of commissioners, in the refusal to officially recognize the United States agent, and in the failure to co-operate with the federal military authorities in the prescribed methods of protecting the frontier⁺⁺. A further instance of an attempted infringement upon Indian lands is to be noted, which is of especial interest because of Georgia's participation in its

* Ind. Affairs, vol.1, pp.551-555.

+ Ibid. p.558.

♦ For history of, see Amer. Hist. Assoc'n. Papers, vol. 5, Yazoo Land Companies, by C. H. Haskins.

++ Ind. Affairs, vol.1, pp.613, 17, 399, 425.



repression.

Elijah Clarke had been active in furthering the schemes of Minister Fanchet in behalf of the French;* in order to be on "foreign" soil, the troops had been levied in Indian territory; after the order of Fanchet, March 8th, 1794, causing the collapse of the enterprise, he was left in Indian territory with soldiers whom his authority had called together, and who looked to him for ^{compensation for the} non-fulfillment of his promises. Spurred by the exigencies of the case, he planned an independent state to be established west of the Oconee River. That the Indians owned the land, seems to have been of no significance in his estimation. He had been one of the commissioners of the treaty negotiated at Galphinston, by which the Talasee country was acquired. He had later been obliged to endure the retrocession of this by the United States, and was doubtless the more ready to even the score by appropriating such lands as his military adherents could use and defend. He had proceeded to the extent of laying out a town, when Governor Matthews caused the squatters to be forcibly dispossessed. +

* Foreign Relations, vol.1, p.311.

+ Ind. Affairs, vol.1, pp.496-499, 502.

Charnell; Miscellanies of Georgia, pp.33-58.

1/4 MSS.Com. Rep., vol.2, pp.571, 574. (A.N.C. 1896, vol.1.)



That sympathy was with him to some extent, is evidenced by the fact that an opinion in his favor , emanating from a county court, is on record.* Governor Matthews had early issued a proclamation ordering his arrest, and he gave himself up, to test the probabilities of general opposition. When the court ruled favorably, his project received a great impetus as he did not believe that the militia would consent to march against him and no influence except force was thereafter able to deter him. Yet he was not popularly supported, for this was not a case of the violation of national obligations merely; for Georgia had laws on her statute books against unauthorized intrusion upon Indian lands, and the precedent of possession without her consent could not be permitted. The action taken, therefore, though urged by the administration, was in maintenance of state authority. It furthered the policy of the President, because the two interests for once co-incided.

At the beginning of 1793, the insufficiency of the treaty of New York, of 1790, to allay enmities was fully proven. As a result of its provisions , there were clearly defined sources of exasperation to all parties concerned. The territories in dispute , granted to Georgia by treaties which were repudiated by the Indians, had been divided; The Creeks regained the Talasee country, between the Altamaha and the

* Ind. Affairs, vol.1, p.496.



St. Mary's, and in return validated the title of Georgia to the tract between the Ogeechee and Oconee rivers; thus the Oconee was made the boundary line, to near its head waters.* The Georgians were not of a compromising temper, and did not graciously accept the fact of the loss of lands, especially as it was accompanied by the guarantee to the Indians of their remaining hunting grounds. It was a strong indication of the coming struggle and was at once regarded with suspicion.

McGillivray and his companion chiefs, returning from the negotiation of the treaty, had been unable to satisfy their countrymen with their report. Secure possession of the Talasee lands did not compensate in their minds for the Oconee limit on the East. Moreover, *certain* ^{disaffected} ~~tricks~~, learning of the personal compensation received by McGillivray, had raised the cry of traitor, and succeeded in greatly lessening the confidence of the Creeks in their leader.+

Spain's grievance lay in the fact that her protectorate, established by the treaty of 1784, had been repudiated, — from her point of view a pernicious and insulting proceeding. Hence arose her deliberate and persistent effort to prevent the accomplishment of the survey necessary to establish a part of the boundary, and to keep alive the resent-

* Indian Treaties to 1837, p.29. Ind. Affairs, vol.1, p.81.
+Milfort; Voyages en Cr  ck, p.145.



ment in the Indian mind against the settlers between the Ogechee and the Oconee.

With the Chickasaws and Choctaws peace existed, but the Cherokees were in a chronic state of dissatisfaction. They complained of undue influence in effecting the cessions of land granted at Hopewell in 1785, and at Holston in 1786, and were continually uneasy because of the encroachments of the whites even beyond the established lines.* Encouraged by the Spanish, they clamored for the old line of the Cumberland River, and sought by their depredations to force back the settlers south of it. Mediation was sought of Spain, and the ultimatum was given by the chiefs that the Cumberland settlement must go. +

In this inveterate hatred against Cumberland, the Creeks joined, basing their opposition upon what the Americans considered a wholly unsubstantial claim to the territory. Because no mention was made of it, in the treaty of New York, they affected to believe that it was not within the protection of the United States.** In 1794, Blount wrote of ~~the~~ ^{the} district, which was 90 miles in length, and 30 miles wide, that there was no five miles of it, but what had been stained with the blood of the inhabitants, since his arrival. °

* Powell: Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, 1883-84, pp.
+ For. Rel., vol.1, p.280, 281. 169-71.
**Ind. Affairs, vol.1, p.447, 449.
Amer. Hist. Mag., vol.3, p.275, vol.4, p.273.
° Ind. Affairs, vol.1, p.535.



Such was the tenseness of the situation in the Southwest at the beginning of 1793 - Georgia in an aggressive mood, the Indians disposed to make their ceded hunting grounds uncomfortable dwelling places, and apparently on the verge of open war, and Spain, an uncertain factor, meddling with the situation to the detriment of all concerned, and with an unlimited power of mischief.

Washington had assumed the difficult task of curbing the one, and conciliating the other, while seeking an adjustment of difficulties with the third. He held Spanish interference so far responsible for existing irritations that he believed that the successful outcome of pending negotiations would open the way for an easy adjustment of the Indian problems. Acquainted with Indian perfidy in his early career, he was not without a just idea of the deplorable situation of the frontiersmen, yet he announced and maintained a policy of peace as the least of a number of inevitable evils. With Spain backing the Indians, and apparently ready to make their cause her own, the possible complications involved in a Creek war were immeasurable. Spain alone, would, at this time have been a formidable enemy. The fact that her forces had been drawn into the maelstrom of the French Revolution was more than balanced by the result, for she had thereby gained Eng-

land as an ally. The analagous position of the two nations on our borders, and the advantages to be derived from their united effort has been suggested. Considering the influence exerted by each over the contiguous Indian tribes, there was more than a possibility of their success, should they attempt to turn the the united Indian forces of the Northwest and the Southwest against the United States to compel the frontier to recede beyond the mountains.

Nor yet was it clear that war would be in accord with that humanity and justice which were the avowed principles of the Indian policy of the administration. For atrocities were wantonly committed on both sides. Often, too, the tribes involved was not to be held responsible; many misdemeanors were comparable, so far as the degree of national accountability was concerned, to our own violations of neutrality, at different periods of our history. They were disavowed, but could not be prevented, and morally, guilt rested with individuals only.

The frontiersman, desperate with their wrongs, were incapable of discrimination and had war been let loose on the frontier, it is a question whether it would not have been a futile effort to right one wrong by another. In the discontent over the lack of adequate protection

of the exposed settlements, one wrote: "It is to be apprehended that more attention would be paid to the loss of a New England cow, than there has been to all the loss of lives and property that Georgia has met with."* That the inactivity of the general government should be construed as indifference was inevitable, since things assume different aspects when viewed from national and personal standpoints. To the administration, this difficulty was one among many in which the new nation was involved, and it must needs be adjusted with reference to the others. Locally considered, without being over magnified, it covered the entire horizon.

It may be noted in this connection, that the absence of a sense of proportionate values was not peculiar to the Easterners. There were those in the territory south of the Ohio who believed that the lives of numerous Indians were fair atonement for the loss of one horse. A major of state militia seeking vengeance with a band of one hundred and fifty men, for the death of an officer killed by horse thieves, declared that he was out to pursue and destroy any parties of Indians of which he might gain intelligence.+

Occasionally an opening was given for an unmistakable

*Draper MSS., Newspaper Extract, Vol. IV, Md. Journal, Aug. 2, 1793.

+Ind. Affairs, vol. I, p. 484.

bly well-directed blow. When the Indian agent, the Georgia officials and the friendly chiefs all agreed upon the guilty parties, there could be no danger of justice miscarrying, had it been undertaken by Federal troops. Early in 1793, there were numerous depredations traced to five towns of the Lower Creeks. After futile efforts to bring them to conform to the will of the nation, the white Lieutenant and other chiefs wrote to Seagrove, the American agent, that they would cheerfully lend any power to extirpate them. Seagrove who was usually for peace, favored retaliation; and a council of war called by the Governor of Georgia began preparations for an expedition.*The towns were persistently hostile and were repudiated by the nation. No better opportunity could have been offered to speak a language which a hostile Creek, with his clan training, could well understand. Yet it was feared by the Government that a move of the kind might prove detrimental to the general peace deemed so important, and an order was issued to Governor Telfair to proceed no further.† He wrote in reply: "I am now compelled to desist from the only measure, which, in my estimation, can give ease and security to the frontier."** A later experience of Cumberland seemed to bear him out in this view, for when a

*Indian Affairs, vol. I, pp. 387, 370.

†Ibid., p. 365.

**Ibid., p. 371.

situation quite similar arose in the Cherokee nation, the punishment of the faction deserving it, brought peace.* Yet the Government countenanced defensive warfare only, and made no exceptions to its policy, in the Southwest.

The Indians became impressed with the idea that the United States would not fulfill the threats made against them, and was not so much to be feared, and they variously ascribed the reason. Some had learned the true state of affairs from the Spanish;+among others it was attributed to cowardice. From the Chickasaws, friends of the country, came exhortations to courage,"for," said one chief,"let a man be ever so small, let him have a big heart and that makes the man."**"If you would treat them as we have," said Payemingo,"they would not think so little of you."° There were those among the Creeks to boast that the Americans were not men, that they had never been against their nation, and to taunt the Chickasaws with weakness because of their friendship for men who would never support them in need.§

With such feelings rife, it is not strange that the seeds of sedition sown by Shawnese ambassadors bore fruit and that a considerable number of the Creeks and Cherokees

*Ind.Affairs,vol.I,p.530.

+Ibid.,pp.437-439.

**Ibid.,p.456.

°Ibid.,p.466.

§Ibid.,pp.442,466.

were persuaded that the opportunity was at hand for freeing themselves from foreign interference.* As evidences multiplied that the United States was in no condition to resort to force, Spanish diplomacy grew more arrogant and peremptory. Spain seemed disposed to exact all she could from the impotence of her rival. While the ravages of the Indians were trying beyond endurance, the frontier settlements of Tennessee, and conservative statesmen felt that a Creek war was inevitable, Viar and Jaudenes, the ambassadors, wrote a letter of complaint to Jefferson accusing the United States of keeping up the intestine war among the Indians, and asserting that peace between the nations was problematical for the future unless more effective measures could be taken to control Indian relations.+

This was insult upon injury. The general feeling prevailed that war with Spain could not be avoided; the ambassadors were ignored, and the reply to the communication was sent to Madrid, that the views of the home government might be learned, but little satisfaction was gained here! Yet shortly after this, the situation was somewhat relieved by a change in the tone of the Spanish officials dealing with the Indians. It seems evident that Genet's project was not without a salutary effect upon our Spanish-Indian relations. The Governor of Louisiana was given orders to

*Ind. Affairs, vol. I, pp. 438, 446. Also Pickett: History of Alabama, vol. II, p. 617.

+Foreign Rel., vol. I, p. 265.

**Jefferson's Writings, vol. VI, p. 344.

prepare for defensive warfare against the French, by a letter dated at Madrid, February 12, 1793.* Viar and Jundenes did not enter formal protest with the Secretary of State until Aug. 27.+

Meanwhile Carondelet and his subordinates were gaining exaggerated impressions of the scope of the enterprise, and realized that power for harm was resident even in a weak nation.**George Rogers Clark's reported success was a suggestion that the nation which could offer the best conditions would be the magnet of attraction to the westerners, whom Carondelet was longing to draw to Spain. As embarrassments increased about the Spanish-American government, it became apparent that the immediate preservation of her domains was dependent on the Indian forces, and that a premature war by the United States against single tribes would cripple this resource.

On Sept. 17, Seagrove wrote that the Spanish agents had changed the style of their talks to the Indians and from this time until after Genet's successor had called off the expedition, their influence in behalf of peace was generally commented on by the Americans of the frontier.

The administration did not confine itself, in pur-

^{4R}
*Draper Coll., Clark MSS., vol. 40, p. 68.

+Amer. Hist. Assoc'n. Rep., 1896, p. 1005.

**Amer. Hist. Com. Rep., vol. I, pp. 1017, 1046, 1063, 1055.

++Ind. Affairs, vol. I, p. 410. Also Draper MSS., Newspaper Extract, vol. IV, Md. Journal, Oct. 29, 1793.

la. H. C.
1896, vol. I.

suing its policy, to merely protecting the Indians. Positive measures were constantly in operation to conciliate them and establish relations of harmony. In these efforts, competition with other nations which had already acquired a confidence among them, determined, in part, the methods used.*In the rivalry for influence, the matter of presents became an increasing burden, yet was considered necessary. Courted by so many, the Indians grew critical, and proved capable of invidious comparisons. They were even known to throw away guns of the French make, as not good enough.+ In their visits to the seat of government too, by invitation, which was a means of intercourse and friendship thought profitable, it was considered important that the hospitalities of the nation meet their approval.** So long as the visits were confined to Philadelphia, Washington proved a gracious host. When, however, chiefs were of necessity entertained for several days on the beautiful grounds of Mt. Vernon, he expressed himself as feeling that the thing was being overdone.

Further civilizing influences were projected in the establishment of trade, which from the first, was one of the features of Washington's plan. When put in operation in 1796, the results justified the high importance attached to it. §

*Ind. Affairs, vol. I, p. 259, Knox to Telfair.

+Draper Coll. Clark MSS.; Carondelet to Alcudia, Sept. 27, '93.

**Amer. Hist. Mag., vol. III, p. 82. §Richardson: Messages of President. Also Ind. Affairs, Vol. I, pp. 583, 524, 601.

Most of all, it would seem, the Government relied upon the character and influence of its Indian agents, in attaining the pacific ends sought. During these years, James Seagrove was the special agent to the Creeks; General James Robertson was temporary agent to the Chickasaws and Choctaws from April, 1792,* while Governor Blount, Superintendent of Indian affairs of the Southwestern district, dealt directly, or through subordinates, with the Cherokees. Mr Leonard Shaw who had been appointed deputy agent to these in 1792, proved a failure and was discharged early in 1793,* and thereafter John McKee acquired the confidence of Blount in this capacity.+

At best, the position of agent was not an enviable one: as "beloved man of both the red men and white," it was difficult to strike the proper balance between the often extravagant expectations on the one side, and the economy strenuously insisted upon, on the other:**and on the part of an agent with the frontier point of view, it was often difficult to maintain the amount of sympathy with the administration policy, which official decorum required.

Although James Seagrove had but little difficulty in this latter respect, yet in many ways, his was a pe-

*Ind. Affairs, vol. I, p. 253. *Ibid., pp. 245, 436.

+Ibid., pp. 435, 538. **Amer. Hist. Mag., vol. IV, p. 259.

culiarly trying situation. He had not the civil authority with which Blount, as Governor, was vested, and could not therefore put in force his views. that the Americans must be restrained, if the Indians were to be pacified. He needed the co-operation of the Governor of Georgia, and, so long as Telfair was in this office, the two were diametrically opposed in their ideas of method. It was his task, too, to execute plans of his superiors, wholly unpopular among the white people with whom he had to deal, and their opposition did not confine itself to verbal disapproval. On the contrary, they carried it to the extent of force, and militia raids thwarted his purposes and even threatened his life.*Whether a tact was within the compass of human nature, sufficient to reconcile the differing interests, and win the favor of all parties is extremely doubtful. Certainly, Seagrove did not possess it. He had few if any friends upon the frontier: Blount and Robertson, usually fair-minded, felt that he did not understand the Indian character, that his credulity was imposed upon, and that as a result, misrepresentations of existing conditions reached Philadelphia.+ His zeal was recognized by all, and deplored by many. Yet the evidences are strong that he contributed largely to the

*Ind. Affairs, vol. J, pp. 412, 469, 425, 426, 409, 411, 415.
+Amer. Hist. Mag., vol. III, p. 288. also Ind. Affairs, vol. J, p. 441.

eventual success of the national program. For among the Indians he was popular, and of steadily growing influence.*

Blount and Robertson worked in perfect harmony, and to their steadiness of character was due largely the commendable moderation of the Southwest Territory, which in certain districts, endured far greater suffering than any part of the frontier of Georgia.+This period of Governor Blount's career shows a man loyal to the administration, whose character was a restraint upon lawlessness. His acquaintance with frontier problems was larger than Seagrove's, and his insight was greater. He kept the confidence of the Indians by his fair and honorable dealings, as his rulings were, generally, of marked justice to both sides.**

On one occasion, when it seemed probable that an unjust raid on the part of General Logan, of Kentucky, would take place in spite of his efforts to the contrary, he wrote to the chiefs of the towns concerned, advising them of the situation and suggesting measures to meet it, at the same time notifying the invaders of his action.++ Promptness and resolution of this nature ensured a well-governed territory. He reported with fullness and accuracy all depredations within his district,§with the hope

*Ind. Affairs, vol. J, pp. 396, 399. +Amer. Hist. Mag., v. JII, p. 276.

**Amer. Hist. Mag., vol. JI, p. 372. Also Indian Affairs, vol. J, pp. 464, 532, 435.

++Ibid., pp. 533, 534. §Amer. Hist. Mag., vol. IV, pp. 178, 250. —

of arousing the nation to action against the Indians. For while as successful as anyone in winning them by peaceful measures, he declared it to be a belief born of his experience, that positive and decided measures were best.*

7 A resource within reach of the Americans, which caused Spain anxiety, was that of stirring up internal strife among the Indians. To the frontiersman, this seemed a tempting solution of perplexities. As it seemed that the Creeks must war, it was clearly to the advantage of the settlements that they follow other war-paths than that leading to the long-suffering Cumberland. Governor Blount and General Robertson received with relief, intelligence of such inter-tribal conflicts, and would gladly have given more encouragement than their official positions permitted. Especially was this true when the friendly Chickasaws were concerned, as was the case in 1793. Governor Blount then sought to gain sanction for aiding them with federal troops.+

The attitude of the administration, however, was construed by his superiors, to involve the maintenance of peace among the tribes. A Cabinet council was held, to deliberate upon the propriety of employing an agent to go among the Choctaws to solicit their aid for the Chickasaws,

*Ind. Affairs, vol. J, p. 541.

+Ibid., pp. 442, 453, 368.

resulting in a tie vote. There was no opposition to the practise of employing Indians against Indians; those opposing were moved by considerations of expediency.* Arms were furnished, as this was held to be within the legitimate office of whites toward neighboring tribes.

To avoid the expense attending frequent conferences with large numbers of chiefs, and to try the power of influence exerted from within, Seagrove received orders in Sept., 1793, to go to the interior of the nation.+ He had already made sufficient headway in his mission to lead to an invitation from such chiefs as the White Lieutenant, of Ockbuskee, the Mad Dog, of Tuckabatche, and the Hallowing King of Cussetah.

The Spanish and the Georgians both bitterly opposed the project, by every possible obstacle; **the former feared his influence, and the latter believed that he would be controlled by the principle of the East, of peace at any cost. Georgia declined to accept peace excepting on her own terms, and this added greatly to the intricacy of Seagrove's problems. They averred ^{that} while claiming to pacify the Indians, he was actually putting a premium upon continued depredations by his conferences and gifts. The truth was that he was in the same position

*Jefferson's Writings, p. 275. (Ford) /

+Ind. Affairs, vol. I, p. 366. .

**Ibid., pp. 411, 425, 427.

as the chiefs themselves regarding the irresponsible young warriors of the Creek nation, and could not guarantee their conduct, though he might win the majority to agree to his terms. Georgia raiding parties were, moreover, continually giving the lie to the agent's assurances of peace, so that there were occasions on both sides for imputations against good faith.*

Seagrove seemed to be rather hesitant to commit himself to the uncertainties of Indian hospitality, and his personal experiences were not wholly pleasant during the six months which followed his departure from the bounds of civilization, yet he accomplished all that could have been hoped. After a seven days trip to the *Lower* towns, under the escort of one hundred and thirty chiefs and warriors, and a conference which continued for two days and nights without adjournment, he had the satisfaction of having his terms accepted. It was unanimously agreed that hostilities against the United States should cease, and that restorations of property and prisoners should be made, and satisfaction given for murders committed.+

From Dec.13, until Jan.3, 1794, Governor Blount was in conference with the Cherokees, and obtained assurances of peace in which he declared he had full faith.** Thus the

*Ind. Affairs, vol. J, p. 372.

+Ibid., p. 471.

**Ibid., p. 272.

year 1794 opened auspiciously. The sense of security was, nevertheless, short-lived. Throughout both of these years, though open outbreaks were not frequent, yet when nine tenths were at peace, one tenth was warlike, and Robertson declared that this was the worst kind of war.*

In this particular instance, while there was every evidence that the Creeks were sincere, troubles were resumed upon the initiative of what Seagrove termed the "outrageous doings of the lawless people of Georgia." He declared that the contest was one between the government and its citizens†"If the latter cannot be restrained, the Indians have no alternative - they must defend themselves."

As a result of these revengeful attacks of the militia, Washington reported to Congress on June 2, that a Creek war seemed more probable, than at any antecedent period,**and Blount in November, wrote to the Secretary of War that if the United States did not destroy the Creeks, the Creeks would kill the citizens of the United States; ~~to~~ kill or to be killed were the alternatives.

To Blount, Robertson, and all on the frontier, it was becoming unbelievable that the United States would not proceed to war against the Creeks. Robertson, by stretching his authority to the limit, had enjoyed the satisfaction of striking a blow at the *Lower* Cherokee towns,

*Ind. Affairs, vol. J, p. 441.

†Ibid., p. 487.

**Ibid., p. 482.

which had not kept the treaty. Through Major Ore's raid, he had anticipated a proposed invasion, and had inflicted salutary chastisement upon Nickajack, and Running Water.* This, together with the news of Wayne's victory, and the influence of the Upper Cherokees, brought the nation unitedly to a real peace.†

Blount was, however, hopeless regarding the Creeks, and submitted to the Government a proposition to exterminate them. He believed that only the superannuated chiefs who had satisfied themselves with blood, would ever give heed to a treaty, and felt sure that he could unite the other tribes against this oge. Both economy and expediency were urged in favor of this method,**

In the confident belief that after the success in the Northwest the Government would be moved to send an army to the aid of the settlements in the spring, intimation was given to the Chickasaws and Cherokees to this effect. On the part of the *Chickasaws*, it met with a more enthusiastic response than was convenient. They took Creek scalps and at once sent a band of seventy warriors to Nashville to aid the cause.

Becoming thus involved in a war with the Creeks, on

*Amer. Hist. Mag., vol. IV, p. 375. Also Indian Affairs, vol. I, p. 530.
†Ibid., p. 535.

**Ibid., pp. 536, 556.

account of their friendship to the United States, they placed the agents, Blount and Robertson, in a serious dilemma. To refuse them aid and to allow them to suffer from the Creeks, would be to deservedly lose their friendship: to re-inforce them, would involve the country in a Creek war, much longed for, but not yet authorized.

The word to strike was still hoped for, the Chickasaws were in arms and expecting it: the Cherokees, too, were ready to aid. But Seagrove, undismayed by the many failures of the Indians to fulfill their promises, yet hoped to reach a substratum of integrity in the perfidious Creek nature, and was still carrying on his negotiations for the return of property and the restoration of tranquility.

Early in his career, he, too, had declared that the Creeks must be controlled by a display of force, and had advised an expedition against the hostile towns.= In his relations with prominent friendly chiefs, he had since seen the best as well as the worst side of the Indian nature, and his six months of intimate acquaintance while living in the nation, seemed to strengthen his faith in the government policy. In the view of the administration, it still seemed that more was to be hoped for from pacific

*Ind. Affairs, vol. I, p. 387.

conduct , than from hostile action. In the Northwest, severe losses had preceded success, it had not yet appeared that a general disposition for peace, and a consequent quiet frontier would follow Wayne's victory. There, too, the contention had been against two or three thousand warriors; the Creek warriors were reported by Seagrove after his visit to the nation, to number ten thousand. The responsibility of the more enlightened and powerful nation toward the uncivilized was also taken into consideration, and used as an argument to the course of liberality and kindness already outlined. Consequently instead of the expected orders for a military expedition, in March, 1795, a notification was given Blount of the decision of Congress to the contrary, and of appropriations made for defense, and for the establishment of trade.*

The disappointment attendant upon this decision resulted in about one hundred citizens of Mero district going voluntarily to the Chickasaw nation, with the evident approval, though without the formal sanction of Robertson. The proceeding was in accord with the unanimous wish of the citizens who believed that to fail to aid their would-be allies, would mean the irreparable loss of their friendship.+

Because of the fear, first of United States re-inforce-

*Ind. Affairs, vol. I, p. 544.
+Ann. Hist. Mag. vol. IV, p. 252.

ments, and later of Cherokee aid, the Creeks delayed their attack, and finally differences were adjusted without much loss to the Chickasaws. The combined influence of Choctaws, Cherokees, the United States, and Spain accomplished this, each of whom, ~~at least~~, wished the quarrel settled.

The frontier settlements attributed their relief from disturbance to the Chickasaws' assertion of force in their behalf. Seagrove doubtless deserved a share of the credit, however, for he had been untiring in his exertions to this end, and had the confidence of leading Creeks. The withdrawal of the Shawnese agitators, and the humbling of the northwestern Indians removed one great cause of restlessness, too, and the latter event may, perhaps, have been a means of intimidation. In October, 1795, Blount could say for the first time in his administration that peace existed not only on paper, but as a fact. In the same month, Pinckney signed the treaty which destroyed all claims to Spanish sovereignty over the Indians, since it fixed her bounds at 31°, and engaged each nation to non-interference with the tribes resident in the territories of the other. This was the culmination of Washington's efforts in behalf of the Southwest, and though long deferred, accomplished the anticipated results, for it

left the nation to deal with the Indian question, independently.

At the request of Georgia, commissioners were appointed to make a new treaty, with a view to securing the lands between the Oconee and Ocmulgee, and in 1796, a conference was held at Coleraine to affect this, if possible. Although no new cession could be gained, consent was obtained for the establishment of trading posts along the Indian frontier, and they ^{Creeks} yielded their claims to the Cumberland region.*

With this treaty the first chapter in the relation of the Southwest Indians with the United States, closes. The next is a record of development in civilization. The volatile and warlike Creek disposition re-asserted itself under the influence of Tecumseh in 1811; fifteen years of improvement did not suffice to steady it. Nevertheless, though peace was but temporarily attained, the outcome seemed to justify the administration policy. As in the controversy with England, so here, the final struggle was deferred until the nation developed its strength.

Yet the working out of it was costly; the period of which these years are typical was a tragical chapter in

*Ind. Affairs: vol. I, p. 587. Also
Amer. Hist. Mag., vol. IV, p. 336.

the history of expansion. *Yet* when viewed in relation to national growth, ~~and~~ the fruits of frontier endurance^{are}, apparent. Tribal character, politics and wars assume significance from the same standpoint, too, as a factor capable of determining the trend of international relations.

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
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